This research examined how strongly appraisals can differentiate positive emotions and how they differentiate positive emotions. Thirteen positive emotions were examined, namely, amusement, awe, challenge, compassion, contentment, gratitude, hope, interest, joy, pride, relief, romantic love and serenity. Participants from Singapore and the USA recalled an experience of each emotion and thereafter rated their appraisals of the experience. In general, the appraisals accurately classified the positive emotions at rates above chance levels, and the appraisal–emotion relationships conformed to predictions. Also, the appraisals (...) were largely judged by participants as relevant to their positive emotion experiences, and the appraisal–emotion relationships were largely consistent across the two countries. (shrink)

Precision Medicine has become a common label for data-intensive and patient-driven biomedical research. Its intended future is reflected in endeavours such as the Precision Medicine Initiative in the USA. This article addresses the question whether it is possible to discern a new ‘medical cosmology’ in Precision Medicine, a concept that was developed by Nicholas Jewson to describe comprehensive transformations involving various dimensions of biomedical knowledge and practice, such as vocabularies, the roles of patients and physicians and the conceptualisation of disease. (...) Subsequently, I will elaborate my assessment of the features of Precision Medicine with the help of Michel Foucault, by exploring how precision medicine involves a transformation along three axes: the axis of biomedical knowledge, of biomedical power and of the patient as a self. Patients are encouraged to become the managers of their own health status, while the medical domain is reframed as a data-sharing community, characterised by changing power relationships between providers and patients, producers and consumers. While the emerging Precision Medicine cosmology may surpass existing knowledge frameworks; it obscures previous traditions and reduces research-subjects to mere data. This in turn, means that the individual is both subjected to the neoliberal demand to share personal information, and at the same time has acquired the positive ‘right’ to become a member of the data-sharing community. The subject has to constantly negotiate the meaning of his or her data, which can either enable self-expression, or function as a commanding Superego. (shrink)

The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is just beginning to be appreciated. Hacker and Baker, Westphal, Monk, and Haller have all drawn attention to significant affinities between the two men's work, and the number of explicit citations of Goethe in Wittgenstein's texts supports the idea that we are not dealing simply with a matter of deeplying similarities of aim and method, but of direct and major influence. These scholarly developments are encouraging because they help to place Wittgenstein's work within an (...) important tradition of German letters which goes far beyond his contemporaries and immediate forebears in Vienna; and they show that Wittgenstein's profound interest in literature and music is ceasing to be merely a matter of biographical anecdote, and is being used to illuminate some of the most central areas of his work. (shrink)

Among bioethicists and members of the public, genetics is often regarded as unique in its ethical challenges. As medical researchers and clinicians increasingly combine genetic information with a range of non-genetic information in the study and clinical management of patients with common diseases, the unique ethical challenges attributed to genetics must be re-examined. A process of genetic routinisation that will have implications for research and clinical ethics, as well as for public conceptions of genetic information, is constituted by the emergence (...) of new forms of genetic medicine, in which genetic information is interpreted in a multifactorial frame of reference. Although the integration of genetics in medical research and treatment may be a helpful corrective to the mistaken assumptions of genetic essentialism or determinism, the routinisation of genetics may have unintended consequences for the protection of genetic information, perceptions of non-genetic information and the loss of genetic research as a laboratory for exploring issues in research and clinical ethics. Consequently, new ethical challenges are presented by the increasing routinisation of genetic information in both biomedical and public spheres. (shrink)

After presenting a variety of arguments in support of the idea that ordinary names are indexical, I respond to John Perry's recent arguments against the indexicality of names. I conclude by indicating some connections between the theory of names defended here and Wittgenstein's observations on naming, and suggest that the latter may have been misconstrued in the literature.

After presenting a variety of arguments in support of the idea that ordinary names are indexical, I respond to John Perry's recent arguments against the indexicality of names. I conclude by indicating some connections between the theory of names defended here and Wittgenstein's observations on naming, and suggest that the latter may have been misconstrued in the literature.

The classical relativistic theory is developed of electric and magnetic fields in terms of boost and rotation generators, respectively, of the Lorentz group of space-time. This development shows that Minkowski geometry requires that there be threestates of polarization of radiation in free space. The magnetic components in a circular basis are right and left circular and longitudinal. The longitudinal component is real and physical, and proportional to one of the three, nonzero, rotation generators of the Lorentz group. The longitudinal electric (...) component is pure imaginary, and proportional to one of the three boost generators. These theoretical arguments conform with experimental data from the Planck radiation law and from magnetic effects of light such as the inverse Faraday effect. (shrink)

Recently, Jonathan Bennett has said some interesting, but mistaken, things about certain themes in Berkeley's philosophy. His comments are interesting because they direct us to a careful scrutiny of Berkeley's arguments and methodology in the often neglected Draft to the Introduction to the Principles, and mistaken because Bennett misinterprets these arguments and methodology. I would like to correct those mistakes because an understanding of Berkeley's Draft is helpful in interpreting the Introduction, which in turn is important for our understanding of (...) not only his philosophical methodology, but also for an adequate interpretation of some of his substantive philosophical claims. I will argue that Bennett misinterprets Berkeley's deleted comments and arguments concerned with two Lockean themes, classification and understanding, as presented in several passages from the Draft which did not appear in the published Introduction to the Principles. In both cases Bennett's confusion is a failure to grasp Berkeley's strategy and target in his attacks upon Locke and the theses he takes Locke to hold. Read in their unedited form the deleted passages not only indicate that Bennett misinterprets them, but they also are suggestive of some interesting philosophical comments on Berkeley's part. (shrink)

This paper gives a simple, elegant statement of the condensed detachment rule that is independent of most general unifiers and proves that this is equivalent to the longer, more usual, formulation.

The theory of personal identity should illuminate and be illuminated by the theory of personality, of which it is a part. I believe that Locke's theory succeeds in this more than that of any other great philosopher, and the modifications which it may need are not fundamental ones. The problems raised by Butler and Flew can be made to disappear.

The standard deduction theorem or introduction rule for implication, for classical logic is also valid for intuitionistic logic, but just as with predicate logic, other rules of inference have to be restricted if the theorem is to hold for weaker implicational logics.In this paper we look in detail at special cases of the Gentzen rule for and show that various subsets of these in effect constitute deduction theorems determining all the theorems of many well known as well as not well (...) known implicational logics. In particular systems of rules are given which are equivalent to the relevance logics E,R, T, P-W and P-W-I. (shrink)

In the early thirties, Church developed predicate calculus within a system based on lambda calculus. Rosser and Kleene developed Arithmetic within this system, but using a Godelization technique showed the system to be inconsistent.Alternative systems to that of Church have been developed, but so far more complex definitions of the natural numbers have had to be used. The present paper based on a system of illative combinatory logic developed previously by the author, does allow the use of the Church numerals. (...) Given a new definition of equality all the Peano-type axioms of Mendelson except one can be derived. A rather weak extra axiom allows the proof of the remaining Peano axiom. Note. The illative combinatory logic used in this paper is similar to the logic employed in computer languages such as ML. (shrink)

The first system of intersection types, Coppo and Dezani [3], extended simple types to include intersections and added intersection introduction and elimination rules (( $\wedge$ I) and ( $\wedge$ E)) to the type assignment system. The major advantage of these new types was that they were invariant under β-equality, later work by Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani [1], extended this to include an (η) rule which gave types invariant under βη-reduction. Urzyczyn proved in [6] that for both these systems it is (...) undecidable whether a given intersection type is empty. Kurata and Takahashi however have shown in [5] that this emptiness problem is decidable for the sytem including (η), but without ( $\wedge$ I). The aim of this paper is to classify intersection type systems lacking some of ( $\wedge$ I), ( $\wedge$ E) and (η), into equivalence classes according to their strength in typing λ-terms and also according to their strength in possessing inhabitants. This classification is used in a later paper to extend the above (un)decidability results to two of the five inhabitation-equivalence classes. This later paper also shows that the systems in two more of these classes have decidable inhabitation problems and develops algorithms to find such inhabitants. (shrink)